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Abstract| The idea that predictions shape how we perceive and comprehend the world has 
become increasingly influential in the field of systems neuroscience. It also forms an 
important framework for understanding neuropsychiatric disorders, which are proposed to 
be the result of disturbances in the mechanisms through which prior information influences 
perception and belief, leading to the production of sub-optimal models of the world. There 
is a widespread tendency to conceptualize the influence of predictions exclusively in terms 
of ‘top-down’ processes, whereby predictions generated in higher-level areas exert their 
influence on lower-level areas within an information-processing hierarchy. However, this 
excludes from consideration the predictive information embedded in the ‘bottom-up’ 
stream of information processing. We describe evidence for the importance of this 
distinction and argue that it is critical for the development of the predictive processing 
framework and, ultimately, for an understanding of the perturbations that drive the 






Biological organisms use sensory inputs to uncover the structure of their surroundings, in 
order to create a representation of their environment. Such a representation is crucial for 
an agent [G] to regulate its interaction with the world (BOX 1) 1. However, sensory inputs 
are ambiguous and noisy and it is believed that the creation of an accurate representation 
of the environment therefore also requires prior information2-4. Predictions [G] derived 
from such prior information are thought to help to resolve the ambiguity in current or 
future sensory signals and allow inference about the external causes of inputs. According to 
this predictive processing framework prediction that is based on prior information about the 
world is a key feature of brain function. 
 
This idea has become increasingly influential across the fields of human psychophysics5,6, 
primate electrophysiology7-10, cognitive and computational neuroscience3,11-14 and clinical 
neuroscience15-22, where it offers new perspectives on disturbances in perception, belief, 
and action. However, it is frequently unclear exactly what is meant by ‘prediction’ and there 
is general imprecision in how the term is conceptualised and used. Almost ubiquitously3,10,23-
27, prediction is considered in terms of higher-level processes acting in a top-down manner 
on mechanisms lower in the information-processing hierarchy. Here, we describe evidence 
that challenges this exclusively top-down view and argue for a framework that 
acknowledges that many forms of predictive information are embedded within the nervous 
system as constraints on bottom-up processing. 
 
In this Perspective, we argue that it is important to distinguish between two types of 
regularity, or ‘patterns’, in the world that together form the basis for predictions in the 
nervous system. We introduce a fundamental distinction between spatiotemporally global 
or constant, non-hierarchical regularities and spatiotemporally local regularities that depend 
on context and are thus hierarchical. We provide evidence to show that predictions based 
on prior knowledge of these two types of regularity are mechanistically distinct: they are 
associated with two different forms of information processing (bottom-up and top-down). 
Finally, we consider, with examples, the importance of distinguishing these two forms of 
prediction. While we believe that it is likely that further sub-divisions will emerge as the 
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field matures, we see this primary distinction —which is based on the form rather than the 
content of predictions —as an important initial step towards a more comprehensive 





[H1] The nature of predictions  
 
Prediction figures prominently in information theory [G] and Bayesian decision theory [G] 28. 
Bayesian models have been particularly important in advancing our understanding of brain 
function, formalising the idea that perceptual and cognitive inference [G] does not 
exclusively rely on current inputs but is shaped by predictions that are based on so-called 
priors [G], or background information about the structure of the environment. It is 
important to emphasise that Bayesian decision theory provides a normative framework29: 
that is, it allows the researcher to specify how an agent should use current inputs and prior 
information to maximise a specified utility [G], given the information to which it has access, 
but it is agnostic as to the precise mechanical implementation of this process29. Just as a 
map may detail an optimal route without suggesting the best means of transport, the 
Bayesian decision framework is concerned with the overall objective of predictions rather 
than the details of how predictions are implemented in the nervous system.  
 
The concept of predictive coding [G] has been immensely influential in shaping how we 
think about neural information-processing, both in health and disease3,13,14,30-32 (FIG. 1 and 
BOX 2) and has inspired some of the most detailed mechanistic formalisations of prediction 
in neuroscience. A range of different predictive coding models have been proposed14. These 
are computationally similar, but make very different assumptions regarding the neural 
implementation (BOX 2). Nevertheless, most predictive coding models have promoted a 
conceptualisation of prediction exclusively in terms of top-down processing2,3,13,30.  
 
A broader perspective on the nature of prediction is offered by early work in the field of 
cybernetics, which prefigured much of the thinking within the current predictive processing 
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framework. Note that here we use ‘predictive processing’ as a general term that 
encompasses predictive coding, the latter being one specific form of predictive processing33. 
The term cybernetics derives from the Greek term for ‘steersman’34, which captures the 
idea that a successful agent must control the effects of its environment in a particular way: 
not necessarily by constraining that environment but by adaptively responding to changes in 
its relevant parameters. The steersman does not control the breezes, tides, and currents but 
makes adjustments that minimise their effects on the boat’s desired course. 
 
Prominent among cyberneticists, W. R. Ashby formulated the ‘Law of Requisite Variety’ and 
the ‘Good Regulator Theorem’ (BOX 1), two complementary principles that are germane to 
our considerations1,35. These principles offer a useful perspective on the nature of 
prediction. They imply that considering the structure of relevant environmental influences 
has the potential to provide important and principled insights into fundamental design 
features of the agent (for similar ideas, see REFs 3,36). Taking this idea further, we believe 
that a consideration of the regularities in the environment that impact on, and must thus be 
modelled by, the agent, provides an opportunity to elucidate the form of the predictions 
that are required.  
 
Different types of environmental regularities can be categorized according to the 
spatiotemporal scales over which they impact on the agent. We suggest that some 
regularities are spatiotemporally global, that is, they are not limited to specific spatial or 
temporal locations,) and are relevant for each encounter between agent and environment. 
They are independent of contextual factors and are therefore non-hierarchical: that is, the 
existence of the regularity is immutable and is not dependent on the context or on other 
states of the environment. It can therefore be hypothesised that modelling such regularities 
requires that the agent possesses similarly context-independent, non-hierarchical 
predictions. Below, we review a growing body of evidence from which we conclude that 
prior knowledge allowing the prediction of spatiotemporally global regularities is embedded 
in the structure of, and thereby affects and constrains, bottom-up information-
processing(FIG. 2a-d). These prior-based influences are predictive in the sense that they are 
estimations of relevant (context-independent) aspects of the agent’s environment that are 
not predicated on current sensory input. We hypothesise that they act automatically and 
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ineluctably on every stimulus that an agent encounters and they determine and shape our 
interaction with the world at all times.  
 
The notion of global predictive constraints, though not new37, is neglected in current 
predictive processing accounts, which concern themselves primarily with a different form of 
prediction, one that relates to spatiotemporally local regularities2,3,10,13,23-26,30. These 
regularities are present, and impact on the agent, only in specific contexts. Owing to their 
context-dependency, they are nested within a hierarchical structure, in which the current 
environmental state determines their presence or relevance. In modelling these regularities, 
the agent’s brain must mirror their characteristics. This can be achieved through a 
hierarchical top-down processing system: higher-level information processing mechanisms 
extract the current context and feed the resulting prediction back to lower-level units to 
modulate earlier processing2,3,10,13,23-26,30 (FIG. 2e-g).  
 
Both types of regularity-to-prediction mappings have their equivalence in the cybernetic 
steersman analogy: the material and shape of the boat are constant because the core 
properties of the medium in which the steersman must travel are constant. By contrast, the 
deployment of the structural features of the boat must change in a context-dependent 
manner to meet the challenges created by changing features of the environment (wind, 
tide, current). In short, the agent has unchanging features, which regulate the unchanging 
influences of its world, but also context-dependent features, which mirror and regulate the 
context-dependent features of its world. In the next section, we outline the evidence 
supporting this distinction. 
 
Henceforward, we use the term ‘constraint’ to refer to prior information that relates to 
context-independent regularities and, consequently, forms the basis for context-
independent predictions. The term is derived from the computational vision field37, where it 
refers to a similar idea. It intuitively captures the notion that the structure of the nervous 
system forces information processing to proceed along predetermined paths. The trajectory 
of these paths is an estimation of the agent’s environment based on prior information and 
is, thus, predictive. Note that we do not argue for a broadening of the definition of the term 
‘prediction’. Rather, we argue that a consistent application of a computational definition of 
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this term leads us to consider constraints on bottom-up processing as being predictive. 
Contrasting with ‘constraints’, we use the term ‘expectation’ to refer to prior information 
relating to context-dependent regularities. Attentional top-down influences are functionally 
different from the predictive processing that is our focus here (BOX 3), and we therefore do 
not discuss them in detail. 
 
[H1] Regularities and predictions  
 
[H2] Context-independent regularities and constraints 
 
The natural world seems highly varied. Yet, surprisingly, images of most natural scenes — 
from Alpine meadows to Mediterranean coastlines — show a large degree of similarity in 
their general statistical properties: in the distribution of orientations of local edges, the 
shapes of contours and the positions of objects, for example38,39. Sensory systems exploit 
these regularities to maximise the amount of information they encode, to optimise 
performance and to minimise metabolic cost38. A growing number of studies exploring the 
neural implementation of the integration of sensory evidence with knowledge-based 
predictions suggest that prior information about global, context-independent regularities is 
implicitly embedded within the structure of information-processing mechanisms40-43. For 
instance, the distribution of orientation in natural images is not uniform: vertical and 
horizontal orientations are overrepresented42 (FIG. 2a,b). As is evident in perceptual biases 
towards the cardinal axes, and in higher sensitivity of neurons to stimuli oriented close to 
these axes, observers exploit this non-uniformity when perceiving local orientation (FIG. 
2c,d) 42. Critically, this constraint is thought to be implicitly embedded within the structure 
of primary visual cortex (V1): electrophysiological work in animals and fMRI in humans 
suggests that neurons tuned to the cardinal orientations are overrepresented in V1 and 
have narrower tuning functions than those tuned to other orientations44,45. These structural 
inhomogeneities implicitly represent prior information of the orientation statistics in natural 
scenes and provide a means for Bayesian inference to be performed in the absence of 
explicit representation of a prior in a top-down hierarchy42. Other regularities in the basic 
attributes of the environment, such as the speed at which objects move, have also been 
suggested to be implicitly represented by embedded constraints in the form of 
inhomogeneities of neuronal densities and tuning functions in relevant neural populations46. 
 8 
 
The grouping of individual features in the environment is also often characterised by global 
and context-independent regularities. For instance, the contours that define the visual 
boundaries of objects follow certain regularities. When extracting contours from an image, 
the human visual system uses prior information of typical contour shape to group local 
information into larger units. This grouping mechanism is called an 'association field', which 
results in a grouping of local orientation that closely match the statistical regularities of 
contours in the world47-49. Such contours are critical for defining image features and objects, 
and animal studies suggest that the selectivity of horizontal connections between neurons 
in early retinotopic cortices might play an important role in establishing the association 
field50,51. For instance, a recent animal study of the ‘silent’ surround – the part of visual 
space in which a stimulus is insufficient to trigger activity in a neuron by itself but can 
modulate its activity –of orientation-tuned V1 neurons suggests that the horizontal 
connectivity structure in V1 is spatially laid out in a pattern highly similar to the 
psychophysical association field in humans 51. The horizontal connectivity pattern in V1 
therefore provides a plausible neurophysiological mechanism for the implementation of 
predictions regarding contours based on prior knowledge of environmental structure. These 
structurally embedded constraints ensure that local orientation information is integrated 
into contours – which are important to separate objects from their background – in line with 
prior knowledge of the structure of the world. These context-independent mechanisms of 
contour integration are likely to be complemented by additional flexible top-down 
influences8. 
 
Even complete objects show certain basic regularities that are context-independent. For 
instance, contours belonging to objects tend to be convex relative to the object52. While a 
range of mechanisms53, including top-down processes54,55, are involved in the visual 
system’s separation of a figure from its background, there is evidence to suggest an 
important role for context-independent predictions that are embedded as a convexity 
constraint on bottom-up processing. Feedforward and feedback neural connections 
terminate in different layers of V156,57, providing an opportunity to distinguish top-down 
modulation from bottom-up processes (which include horizontal influences). Using laminar 
recordings in macaque monkeys, it has been demonstrated that horizontal connectivity in 
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V1 plays an important role in early aspects of figure–ground separation58. Importantly, 
computational models suggest that the specificity of the facilitatory and inhibitory 
horizontal connections between neuronal circuits in V1 allows them to implement 
predictions based on a convexity constraint that exploits context-independent object 
structure59,60.  
 
Another example of context-independent regularities relates to the fact that specific object 
types are often found in highly predictable locations. Because of the structured way in 
which agents interact with the environment, regularities in world-centred coordinates often 
translate into regularities in the visual field (i.e., in retinotopic coordinates). For instance, 
grass and carpets are typically found in the lower half of our visual field, faces and text in 
the centre and tree-top canopies in the upper half. Intriguingly, recent evidence using 
population receptive-field mapping in humans suggests that predictions regarding these 
positional regularities are embedded within the receptive field properties of high-level 
visual cortex neurons that are tuned to specific object categories61,62: specifically, their 
receptive fields are biased towards the locations of the visual field in which the preferred 
object category is typically found62. For instance, word-selective neuronal populations 
exhibit receptive fields that are small, biased towards central vision, and extend more 
horizontally than vertically in English speakers61. Similar correspondences between 
receptive field properties in neurons tuned to certain categories of objects and the typical 
location of these objects in visual space can be found in faces and scenes63. 
 
Overall, the evidence described above serves to illustrate that information relating to time- 
and space-invariant statistical regularities of environmental properties is implicitly encoded 
in stable, structural components of the information-processing system. The resulting 
predictions thus act on, or constrain, bottom-up information processing. Here, we have 
largely focussed on perceptual processing, but similar examples of context-independent 
constraints can be found in learning and other cognitive domains. For example, it has been 
shown that not all environmental regularities are learned equally well by all organisms64. 
Rather, there seem to be constraints on the readiness to form associations that might 
reflect an embedded model based on environmental regularities relevant for a given 
organism. A fascinating recent example comes from a study that exposed two groups of 
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Drosophila to experimental environments, in which a visual or an olfactory cue, respectively, 
was a reliable predictor of an aversive chemical stimulus65. After 40 generations, the insects 
had evolved into two lines with a readiness to form an association with the respective 
relevant cue. Embedding prediction in constraints on bottom-up information processing 
allows the organism to maximise information content and performance, while keeping 
metabolic costs at a minimum41. It is therefore not surprising that algorithms used in 
artificial intelligence exploit similar context-independent regularities, and embed them 
within the structure of artificial networks31.  
 
The question arises as to the origins of these embedded constraints. In biological organisms, 
it is often conceptually and methodologically difficult to tease apart the contribution of 
phylogeny and ontogeny in these embodied processes. A detailed discussion of this 
question goes beyond the scope of this paper, but the existing evidence suggests there is no 
one-size-fits-all explanation. It seems most likely that the neural circuits underlying 
constraints are established by an interaction between the shaping of the developing 
nervous system in response to sensory stimulation during sensitive periods and a 
phylogenetically-determined predisposition66,67. However, in some extreme examples in 
both humans and animals, constraints appear to be independent of sensory experience and 
to be determined by a genetically-defined blueprint68,69. It might also be possible for 
constraints to emerge in response to consistent experience during adulthood. 
 
[H2] Context-dependent regularities and expectations 
 
Many regularities in an agent’s environment are context-dependent (FIG. 2e-g). For 
instance, a forest walk makes an encounter with woodland birds more likely than an 
encounter with a wader. Identification of the bird species in turn leads to a high-level 
representation that predicts other features — which might not be available at the time of 
identification — such as the presence of a specific type of beak70. The beak determines 
lower-level regularities such as the presence of specific contours or oriented edges in a 
specific part of visual space. In this example, context-dependency refers to the fact that the 
regularities of local, low-level features of the input are determined by its higher-level 
aspects, or by information that is independent of this input. Thus, in addition to its context-
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independent regularities, our environment is further structured in a hierarchical and nested 
manner: higher-level aspects of the environment induce, or determine regularities at a 
lower level. We hypothesise that such context-dependent environmental regularities must 
be paralleled by similarly hierarchical and nested information-processing mechanisms in the 
brain. We suggest that this is achieved by the implementation of top-down influences within 
a hierarchy of processing steps, such that higher-level processes extract contextual 
information, derive predictions, and feed them back to modulate earlier aspects of 
perceptual processing.  
 
Top-down processes have been characterised at many different levels of the cortical 
hierarchy. In the ornithological example above, the visual scene context determines which 
animal is likely to be encountered. There is substantial evidence to suggest that the brain 
uses such scene–object dependencies to aid and modulate object perception71. For 
instance, objects presented in their typical scene contexts are identified faster and more 
accurately72. This facilitation is thought to be based on predictions that are rapidly derived 
from the scene in high-level context-specific cortices and are fed back to shape lower-level 
object representations73. Once an object’s rough outline is segmented and separated from 
the scene, predictions about regularities at a smaller scale are derived, leading to a highly 
dynamic interaction between the processing of local features and the representation of the 
segmented object5. As is to be expected, given the hierarchical and nested nature of the 
environment, electrophysiological evidence in primates suggests that top-down influences 
filter down the information processing hierarchy in a highly specific manner, reaching even 
some of the earliest levels of information processing in subcortical structures such as the 
lateral geniculate nucleus74,75. 
 
In the examples discussed above, the information from which predictions are derived is 
largely provided by the sensory input itself. However, a small but growing body of literature 
suggests that top-down effects that mirror environmental regularities go far beyond those 
that are input-based. For example, the expert knowledge of field ornithologists allows them 
to detect and identify bird species within a split second. Psychophysical and neuroimaging 
evidence has indeed shown that specific object-knowledge plays an important role in the 
segregation of a figure from its background, exerting its influence via top-down 
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modulation54,55. Moreover, detailed psychophysical studies suggest that expectations about 
specific object properties and even semantic meaning, which are both acquired prior to 
encountering the object and are thus stored in high-level memory systems, can flexibly 
shape the properties of early visual feature-detectors by top-down modulation6,76-78 (FIG. 
2e-g and BOX 2). These psychophysical findings are consistent with neuroimaging studies 
showing that prior object-knowledge, which is represented in a distributed network 
including high-level frontal and parietal areas, dynamically interacts with visual processing in 
early retinotopic areas79,80. Interestingly, both psychophysical81 and neuroimaging studies11 
suggest that merely the expectation of specific stimulus properties activates feature-specific 
templates in early visual cortices.  
 
Social interactions in humans, and other social animals, are highly context-sensitive82 and 
several studies indicate that predictions derived from prior social knowledge are an 
important source of top-down influences on information processing. For instance, 
psychophysical evidence suggests that the human brain uses knowledge of context-
dependent regularities of social interactions in a top-down manner to guide processing of 
motion patterns generated by other people83. Even factors such as the mental states 
attributed to another person, for example the intention to initiate a movement, can have 
top-down effects that influence how social input is processed by early sensory processes 84-
87.  
 
Repeated exposure to the same or similar sensory stimulation also affects sensory 
processing and perception, a phenomenon often called adaptation. A number of different 
effects are subsumed under this term, and their mechanisms are not well understood24,88-91. 
Current models largely reject passive ‘neural fatigue’ as an explanation and regard 
adaptation as a set of active processes88,89. However, there is no consensus on whether 
adaptation is underpinned by predictive processing92-95. Effects such as the reduced neural 
response to repeated or predictable stimuli, or the closely related enhancement in response 
to unpredictable stimuli, are thought to be linked to context-dependent predictions24,96 
based on top-down processing93,96-100. However, the picture is highly complex, since bottom-
up processes have also been shown to contribute to adaptation effects91,94. Experimental 
work linking adaptation to bottom-up processing under constant viewing conditions, but to 
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top-down processing under variable viewing conditions101,102 suggests the intriguing 
possibility of two separate mechanisms: a context-independent constraint that acts on 
bottom-up processing and context-dependent predictions underpinned by top-down 
processing that take effect in changeable environments. 
 
In summary, there are numerous instances in which the predictability of the environment is 
context-dependent. Under such circumstances, the predictive information embedded in 
constraints on bottom-up processing described in the previous section is unhelpful. Rather, 
the optimal behaviour of an agent will depend upon its ability to deploy predictions that can 
flexibly modulate information processing via top-down processes. It is this second form of 
prediction that is the sole focus of current predictive processing models. 
 
 
4. Implications and applications 
 
One might argue that there is no need to distinguish different forms of prediction because 
all ultimately serve the same purpose103: to facilitate inference about the state of the world 
and thereby optimise an organism’s interaction with it. This point is reasonable when efforts 
are directed towards high-level, functional descriptions of behaviour, as is the case for many 
models concerned with optimality29. Such models provide an invaluable benchmark against 
which to evaluate an agent’s performance from a functional perspective.  
 
However, the predictive processing framework frequently makes an additional mechanistic 
commitment: the default assumption is that predictive processes are mediated by top-down 
mechanisms10,23-26. As we show above, this view is incomplete: predictive information can 
be implemented in the brain in at least two broad forms. If a mechanistic understanding is 
our goal, a correction to the current unitary view is essential. We see a number of ways in 
which recognising this distinction enhances and extends the value of the predictive 
processing framework. 
 
[H2] Linking computational models to mechanisms 
If a computational approach only recognises top-down predictions, it risks a disconnect 
between modelling and mechanistic insight, which in turn can impede progress generated 
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by the feedback loop between models and empirical research. Examining predictive 
processing accounts of illusions25,104-108 illustrates this problem. ‘Illusions’ generally arise 
from sensory inputs that are deliberately manufactured to violate the predictions of 
perceptual systems. In current predictive processing accounts, illusions are therefore 
conceptualised as resulting from top-down processing. For instance, the classic Cornsweet 
effect109 – in which two equiluminant patches separated by a central graded section appear 
to differ in terms of luminance – has been treated as an illustration of top-down influences, 
relating to prior beliefs about spatial gradients of luminance and reflectance25 and has been 
simulated using a network explicitly implementing top-down predictions104. However, 
though it might be modulated by higher-level influences110, there is evidence to suggest that 
most of the effect is due to predictive information that is embedded in early subcortical or 
even retinal processes: the Cornsweet effect can be theoretically linked to the receptive 
field structure of retinal ganglion cells111, is strongly correlated with signals recorded in the 
lateral geniculate nucleus112 (to which retinal ganglion cells project) and has been 
demonstrated to arise from monocular neurons112, suggesting that it is of subcortical origin. 
More generally, a major challenge for the top-down processing account of illusions is the 
finding that the neural circuits responsible for their emergence can be independent of any 
prior experience: congenitally or early-onset blind individuals experience certain illusions, 
such as the Müller-Lyer illusion, immediately after eye-sight restoring surgery68.  
 
We do not contest that ‘illusions’ such as the Cornsweet effect are experienced because of 
predictive processing. Importantly, however, we argue that many (but not necessarily all) of 
these phenomena are better explained by predictive information realised in context-
independent constraints on bottom-up processing rather than top-down modulation. To 
provide another example, a number of ‘illusions’ are related to the light-from-above 
prior113, which we discuss in detail in the next section. The disconnect between empirical 
evidence and model demonstrates that an explanation might have descriptive validity at a 
computational level but be misguided at the mechanistic level. Interestingly, it has been 
shown that even Rao and Ballard’s seminal predictive coding framework can be 
reformulated in such a way that predictions are implemented by lateral inhibition rather 
than feedback connections14,30,114. 
 
 15 
Clearly we need a much tighter integration of mechanistic insight and computational 
modelling as well as a move towards greater precision in distinguishing different forms of 
predictions at different levels of granularity. For instance, one recent finding tentatively 
supports the view that context-dependent predictions might share a common source and 
context-independent predictions that might rely on inbuilt constraints share another 
source115, but much more detail is required. We see the recognition that predictive 
information can be implemented in two broad forms (constraints and expectations) as a first 
step that may help to inspire models that retain the computational benefits of predictive 
processing but are mechanistically more precise and more powerful in their capacity to 
elucidate neural mechanisms. For example, these models might stimulate investigations of 
the implications of a single computational principle being implemented by different 
mechanisms at the systems or behavioural level. 
 
[H2] Elucidating interactions between predictions 
Within hierarchical predictive processing accounts, predictions are generated at a number 
of different levels of the information-processing hierarchy. Predictions at different levels are 
thought to interact with each other via top-down mechanisms to ensure that, ultimately, all 
predictions are mutually consistent13,14,30. However, it is likely that bottom-up constraints 
and top-down expectations might interact in a fundamentally different way. Since 
constraints will remain largely unaltered by short-term changes in expectations, constraints 
and expectations may affect the same processes but will not directly influence each other to 
become mutually aligned. 
 
The ‘light-from-above prior’ provides an instructive example. The direction from which light 
hits a visual scene and the resulting shading provides information that the human visual 
system uses to infer object shape113. In the absence of explicit information about the 
position of the light-source, human observers judge object shape in a way that suggests that 
the visual system implicitly predicts that the light comes from above113. Interestingly, this 
prediction can be modified through experience116: after training in which observers receive 
feedback indicating that the position of the light-source has shifted, the visual system’s 
predictions move towards the new location. The conventional predictive processing account 
of this phenomenon suggests that the top-down predictive information has been 
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updated117. However, this is inconsistent with findings that the new prior is specific to the 
laboratory context118,119, as are priors arising from other learned cues 120. An alternative 
interpretation, which is consistent with this context-specificity and with electrophysiological 
evidence121, is that the light-from-above prior is implemented as a constraint on bottom-up 
processing, and is unchanged by short-term experience. The experimental training, rather 
than changing the original constraint, produces a novel, context-specific expectation that 
light has shifted118,119.  
 
Our hypothesis about the interactions between different forms of prediction leads to an 
interesting prediction: that when information from constraints and expectation interacts, 
the former might never be fully overwritten by the latter. This stands in contrast to the 
purely top-down predictive processing account, wherein the ultimate aim is to ensure that 
all predictions are mutually consistent. Furthermore, our account suggests that 
experimental manipulations of top-down processing should differentially affect the newly 
acquired prediction but might leave the original prior intact. This differential effect should 
furthermore be observable at a neural level. For example, we would predict that 
neuroimaging experiments would show the effects of short-term learning of a shifted light-
source location in higher processing areas, while neural signatures of early, bottom-up 
processes thought to underpin the constraint121 would remain unchanged.  
 
This form of interaction between two different forms of prediction could help to strike an 
optimal balance between robustness and flexibility, allowing for context-related 
modification of the expression of embedded constraints without altering either the 
constraints themselves or their expression outside the narrow confines of this context. 
Interestingly, the interaction appears not to be common to all organisms: even after 
extended experience, chickens perceive object shape in a way that suggests their visual 
system assumes light to come from above69. From birth, it appears, chickens have an 
immutable bottom-up constraint predicting light from above and are unable to acquire a 
context-dependent expectation to modulate these inbuilt predictions, powerfully illustrating 
that predictive information can be entirely decoupled from an individual’s experience with 
the world.  
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[H2] Identifying mechanisms to inform clinically-relevant questions 
Clinical practice and research in psychiatric and neurological illnesses are hampered by the 
fact that heterogeneous symptom clusters may be classed within the same diagnostic 
categories while, conversely, different diagnoses may be underpinned by overlapping 
neurophysiological disturbances122,123. Therefore, research often eschews standard 
diagnostic categories to focus on single symptoms, seeking a narrower but deeper 
understanding of the mechanisms by which these symptoms arise. The predictive processing 
framework has been an important part of this enterprise15-17,82,106. But its focus on one form 
of prediction has constrained the extent to which it can account for the diversity of 
symptoms.  
 
In particular, models that are mechanistically misguided or under-developed will face 
problems, even if they correctly capture symptoms at the computational level. Instances in 
which different mechanistic disturbances underlie two apparently similar clinical patterns, 
provide an illustration of this issue. For example, a current challenge in neuropsychiatry 
concerns the clinical overlap — but underpinning neurobiological distinction — between 
autoantibody-mediated psychosis and other forms of psychosis (such as that found in 
schizophrenia) 124. Increasing attention has been drawn to the significant proportion of 
people who present with psychotic experiences and are found to have IgA antibodies to 
NMDA receptors in their serum or cerebro-spinal fluid. These antibodies may be, but are not 
necessarily, the underlying cause of the psychosis124. Since the treatment for antibody-
mediated psychosis – immunotherapy – should only be administered when clinically 
indicated, clinicians are faced with a decision that demands a mechanistic rather than a 
computational understanding. Put more simply, although a predictive processing model may 
be agnostic to mechanisms and still provide an adequate high-level explanation for 
psychotic symptoms, practical clinical considerations, such as treatment selection, demand 
a mechanistic account.  
 
As questions relating predictive processing to clinical symptoms and syndromes become 
more specific, a comprehensive perspective on the different forms of prediction, and their 
interactions, will yield important insights. One important question is whether different types 
of predictive information can compensate for each other, and what the implications of such 
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compensation are at the systems and behavioural level. Hallucinations, perceptual 
experiences that occur in the absence of an external stimulus, provide a useful illustration of 
this idea. Hallucinations are associated with a range of different psychiatric and neurological 
disorders125-127, are experienced by a surprisingly large number of healthy individuals128 and 
are also associated with drugs, both therapeutic and recreational129,130. They are a key 
feature of schizophrenia where they have been hypothesised to occur as a consequence of 
over-reliance on top-down, predictive processing15,17,105,131,132. Paradoxically, however, the 
predictive processing framework has also been used to derive the opposite conclusion 
about the nature of the imbalance in psychosis — that is, that it is underpinned by an under-
reliance on top-down processing – both clinically107 and as a part of the psychedelic drug 
experience129. This idea has been partly inspired by the relative resistance of people with 
psychosis to illusions 105-108 (but see REF 133), which are generally conceptualised as arising 
from top-down processing. To resolve this apparent inconsistency, it has recently been 
speculated that people with hallucinations exhibit under-weighting of top-down processing 
early in the hierarchy (conferring illusion-resistance) and over-weighting of top-down 
processing higher up in the hierarchy (conferring hallucination-proneness)105,106. However, 
this account fails to specify what is considered to be low or high levels of the processing 
hierarchy. Furthermore, as we discuss above, the empirical evidence does not support the 
notion that all illusions are due to top-down processing based on prior experience.  
 
Recognising different forms of prediction offers an alternative perspective on this paradox, 
which might add (or be an alternative) to the existing explanation: a weakening of 
embedded constraints would confer resistance to illusions and, to compensate for the 
resulting reduced influence of constraints, would also enhance the relative impact of top-
down influences that produce the hallucinatory experiences17. Moreover, since 
hallucinations occur in multiple disorders with varying pathologies, it is likely that a 
predictive processing account that encompasses both embedded constraints and context-
dependent expectations, as well as the interaction between them, provides important 
explanatory potential. On the one hand it offers perspectives on the lower level perceptual 
changes that may accompany symptoms in psychotic illness and that are often 
neglected134,135 in favour of more complex disturbances and their associated high-level 
explanations. On the other hand it may provide deeper understanding of how complex 
 19 
symptoms such as hallucinations, which are similarly defined in psychosis, dementia, or 
sensory disturbance127, may (despite superficial similarities) be explained in terms of very 
different underlying mechanisms. These advantages may transfer well to considerations of 
the multiple pharmacological manipulations that produce psychotic experiences: the 
variable effects produced by a number of drugs have already been recognised to demand a 
consideration of both top-down and bottom-up effects130 and a readiness, therefore, to 
consider predictions in their distinct forms will enrich this theoretical perspective. 
 
[H2] Relating an agent’s neural toolbox to environmental statistics 
We have suggested that characteristics in the environment underpinning predictions are 
usefully classed as context-independent or context-dependent regularities, and that these 
map onto constraints and expectations, respectively. A move towards acknowledging the 
importance of these fundamentally different forms of prediction may inspire a more general 
extension of the predictive processing framework than we have outlined in the previous 
sections. In particular, the aim of linking an agent’s information processing to environmental 
statistics has been a guiding principle in work on natural scene statistics38 and offers, we 
suggest, a similar, principled framework for guiding research in predictive processing. For 
instance, analysis of environmental regularities might allow us to predict and explain the 
extent to which predictions are mediated by top-down processes or by constraints on 
bottom-up processing, or why differences exist in the susceptibility of predictive processes 
to context-dependent, short-term changes. More generally, formal analyses of relevant 
regularities in an organism’s environment might prove useful in developing a unifying 
framework that is able to explain why an organism’s predictions in different domains might 
come in different forms. This idea provides a means of linking the predictive processing 





The principle underlying our argument is simple: critical design features of an agent’s 
information-processing mechanisms can be understood by observing the structure of its 
environment. This basic idea is not new and drove the thinking of early cognitive 
 20 
biologists137 and cyberneticists34, as well as current work on natural scene statistics38. Here, 
we have argued that applying this principle to the role of prediction in brain function points 
to a fresh and useful perspective. To achieve a deeper understanding of the brain as a 
‘prediction machine’33, we suggest that it is necessary to recognise that prediction in the 
nervous system comes in different forms. Immutable regularities of an environment are 
mirrored in corresponding context-independent predictive mechanisms that act on bottom-
up processing, mechanisms that we have referred to as constraints. Fluctuating, context-
dependent regularities in the world likewise point towards flexible, context-dependent 
predictive mechanisms implemented by top-down processes, which we refer to as 
expectations. As predictive processing develops and is applied to ever more specific, 
mechanistically-based questions, other distinctions may usefully be made but we argue that 
the one suggested here is primary and fundamental.  
 
While we have explored these ideas mainly with respect to neural information processing, a 
comprehensive view of the role of prediction in information-processing must ultimately 
include an appreciation that the whole organism interacts with its environment138. 
Predictive information is present not only in neural mechanisms but in the morphology of 
the organism as a whole, as is illustrated in numerous examples of sensory and behavioural 
ecology. Ultimately, the predictive processing framework should aim to incorporate the 
many different ways in which prediction is part of biological information-processing in order 
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Fig. 1: Possible neural network implementation of predictive coding  
a| The basic components of a predictive coding network and the basic equations necessary 
to perform inference14. In the schematic, neural units within a simulated predictive coding 
network are indicated by circles and facilitatory and inhibitory connections are shown. Two 
error units and two prediction units are shown, the dashed grey lines indicate potential 
additional units. The subscripts enumerate the units and their inputs. The activity of 
prediction units (s) signals the estimate of the current world state. Using this estimate, a 
generative model of the world (V) generates a prediction about the input (p, equation 1), 
which is transmitted from prediction units to error units via weighted connections . 
Differences (prediction errors) between the actual input (i) and the predicted input (p) are 
indicated by the activity of error units (e, equation 2). The prediction error is then used to 
recursively adjust the activity of the prediction units so that they better estimate the current 
world state (equation 3). The parameter μ controls the extent of adjustment in the 
prediction units; T indicates that the transpose of V is used. While only non-predicted 
information (the prediction error) is transmitted between error and prediction units, 
prediction units use this information to hone in on a sharpened representation of the state 
of the world. In this version of predictive coding, V — which represents the generative 
model of the world — is often (but not always) thought to be implemented in the synaptic 
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weights of the feedback connections between prediction and error units. Over longer time 
periods, learning can lead to adjustments of this model. b| The most influential predictive 
coding accounts3,30 assume a hierarchical implementation of the basic components 
illustrated in part a. That is, predictions are generated in units in higher-level cortical areas 
and are communicated to error units in lower-level cortical areas via feedback connections. 
For instance, units at level 1 provide feedback to units at level 0 (the input level), while 
those at level 2 provide feedback for units at level 1. Horizontal connectivity between units 
at the same hierarchical level ensures that prediction units at different levels of the 
hierarchy are driven towards mutually consistent predictions by the reciprocal influences of 
the intervening error units. However, while this predictive coding scheme is currently the 
most widely used, it is not the only one possible (Box 2). 
 
Fig. 2: Context-dependent and context-independent predictions. 
Local orientation – the information contained in a small patch of visual space relating to the 
orientation of, for example, a contour or an edge in that area – provides an illustration of 
predictions based on context-independent and context-dependent regularities. a| Examples 
of possible natural visual scenes. b| Analysis of local orientation across a large number of 
such images shows that horizontal (0 and 180 degree) and vertical (90 degree) orientations 
are overrepresented in natural scenes42 (please note that the images used for this study did 
not include those shown in part a). The y-axis indicates the probability of a certain 
orientation being found in a local patch of an image of a natural scene. c| Computational 
and empirical evidence suggests that the early stages of visual processing in humans 
implicitly exploit this context-independent regularity to constrain bottom-up information 
processing. Specifically, the tuning properties of orientation-tuned neurons are biased 
towards more frequently encountered orientations42,44,45. Thus, context-independent 
predictions about inhomogeneities in local orientation are applied to all stimuli fed through 
the visual system. d| The prior used by the human visual system when judging local 
orientation has been derived from psychophysical data using a Bayesian framework. This 
prior (dark green line) shows a close correspondence to environmental regularities (light 
green line). Critically, the simulated, neuronal inhomogeneities shown in c implement a 
prior that is very similar to that used by human observers e| Local orientations also show 
strong context-dependent regularities. For instance, the recognition of hills in the left image 
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allows prediction of the trajectory of local orientation along a hill (as indicated by the grey 
arrows). Conversely, the recognition of a face as a face (right image) and the identification 
of different parts of the face can be used to predict the likely orientation of, the cheek and 
jaw line, for example6 (indicated by the white arrows). These predictions are highly context-
specific and differ depending on the type and precise spatial location of the object in the 
visual scene. f| That the visual system relies on such predictions and implements them via 
top-down modulation of early sensory processes has been shown in a psychophysical 
study6. In this study, observers viewed small ‘edge probes’ that were embedded within 
ambiguous stimuli. An example of this type of stimulus is shown in the right panel: please 
note that this is an illustrative example only and was not one of the stimuli used in the study 
in REF 6 (which cannot be shown due to copyright). The orientation of the edge probes was 
determined by the orientation information extracted from contours in an unambiguous 
version of the same visual scene (left panel). The ambiguous stimuli, within which the 
probes were embedded, were only perceived as coherent objects after observers received 
prior object-knowledge by exposure to the umambiguous version of the same visual scene. 
(before receiving this knowledge they were perceived as meaningless patches)6. Prior 
object-knowledge thus provides control over object representations while sensory evidence 
remains identical. g| The manipulation of object knowledge combined with precise 
psychophysical measurements demonstrated that, when local oriented edges are 
embedded within a meaningful object, neurons in the primary visual cortex (V1) dynamically 
hone their sensitivity to the currently relevant features, leading to a sharpening of low-level 
detector properties6. The plots show the difference in orientation between two edge probes 
on the horizontal axis, and the performance of observers in a task in which they had to 
discriminate between the two probes on the vertical axis. Orientation sensitivity is 
measured as the smallest difference in orientation between two probes that observers are 
able to discriminate at a pre-specified performance level (red and blue dashed lines). This 
sensitivity threshold is illustrated by the red and blue double-headed arrows. Observers 
performed the same task with the same stimuli once before (blue lines) and once after 
having received prior knowledge allowing manipulation of object perception (red lines). 
Without prior object knowledge the stimuli were perceived as meaningless patches; 
however, with knowledge the observers saw objects. The left panel shows performance 
when edge probes were congruent with the object that the observer perceived. Here, the 
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difference between the red and the blue double-headed arrows illustrates that observers 
were more sensitive to the orientation of the edge when the probe was embedded in a 
meaningful object percept than when they perceived the edge as being embedded in 
meaningless patches. The panel on the right illustrates the same task except that edges 
were incongruent with the observer’s object percept. In this case, there is no difference in 
sensitivity before and after having received prior object knowledge. The right hand image in 
part a is reproduced with permission from REF 17. Parts b-d are adapted, with permission, 
from REF42. Parts e (right hand image) and f are adapted, with permission from REF 17. 
Panel g is adapted, with permission, from REF6.  
 
 
Box 1: Learning from cybernetics  
 
In the field of cybernetics (as in the fields of reinforcement learning and artificial 
intelligence) it is convenient to divide systems, sets of interacting components that form a 
unified whole, into agents and their environments. What is considered the system, agent, 
and environment depends on the specific question. For example, the system might be a fish 
(agent) responding to the eddies and currents of a stream (environment), or it might be 
subcomponents of the fish’s skeletal apparatus (agent) acting within the overall body 
(environment). Alternatively, we might think of the system as the stream and all of its 
lifeforms. Cybernetics is concerned with how agents interact with their surroundings to 
maintain internal stability in the face of changes in their environment. Early cyberneticists 
recognised that this premise could also be used to frame investigations into the brain and 
were mindful that the optimal responses of an agent to environmental disturbances would 
be proactive rather than reactive, i.e., prediction is required1. One of pioneers of this field, 
W. R. Ashby, and his co-workers produced two axioms highlighting the nature of agents that 
successfully resist environmental perturbation: 
 
- Variety in the agent is required to deal with variety in its environment – Within the 
field of cybernetics ‘variety’ refers to the number of states that a system (the 
environment or the agent) can adopt. If an agent is to control or regulate the impact 
of its environment in order to maintain its own internal stability, then it must have a 
repertoire of states at least as great as the number of ways in which the 
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environmental can affect it. This is the so-called Law of Requisite Variety35. Note that 
this law refers to the agent’s capacity to maintain the parameters of its own states 
within desirable limits by responding to environmental influences, rather than to its 
capacity to influence directly the environment. Thus, the number of requisite states 
in the agent must match or exceed the number of ways in which its environment 
may perturb or influence it, rather than the number of states that this environment 
can visit.  
- Good regulators are models of their environment: Intimately related to the Law of 
Requisite Variety is the Good Regulator Theorem1, a mathematical formalisation of 
the observation that, for an agent to successfully mitigate the impact of 
environmental states, it must, in some sense, be a model of its environment: that is, 
it must have a variety of states that map onto, or directly correspond to relevant 
environmental states.  
 
Early cyberneticists were mainly concerned with performance of simple agents. One 
celebrated example of this was a series of autonomous ‘tortoise’ robots that engaged in 
complex interactions with their environments based on a few simple reactive responses to 
environmental changes34. Cyberneticists quickly recognised that the same principles applied 
to information processing in the brain1: successful responses to environmental influences 
require an agent’s control structures to model and predict the relevant aspects of the 
environment. This means that we can learn much about the brain’s design features by 




Box 2: Predictive coding and related computational approaches 
The basic idea underlying predictive coding is that the brain capitalises on an internal, or 
generative, model of the word to actively predict incoming information (Fig. 1a). The 
deviation of this predicted information from the actual information received is used to drive 
the inferential process towards a best estimate of the current state of the world3,13,14,30. A 
number of algorithms have been proposed for predictive coding, differing in fundamental 
aspects such as the form of the generative model, the criteria used to drive inference and 
the nature of the information being transmitted for further processing14. Hypotheses about 
the neural implementation of predictive coding have also varied: while some models 
suggest a bottom-up form of predictive coding30,139, one of the most influential forms of 
predictive coding3,13 proposes a hierarchically organised system (Fig. 1b), in which 
predictions are generated at higher levels to be fed back for comparison to inputs at earlier 
levels. Following such comparison, the processing of correctly-predicted information is 
suppressed, whereas prediction errors are passed on to the next level of neural processing 
for further processing and to drive inference to achieve the overall goal of prediction-error 
minimisation.  
 
Although suppression or ‘dampening’ of correctly-predicted information is emphasised in 
this model of predictive coding recent psychophysical evidence suggests that prediction can 
serve to make the perceptual representations of predicted events more distinct than those 
of unpredicted events6,76-78 (Fig. 2f,g). This sharpening is not necessarily inconsistent with 
predictive coding theory, which suggests that activity in units that generate predictions 
rapidly converges on a fine-tuned representation. Nevertheless, other computational 
approaches that include predictive components place a stronger emphasis on this 
sharpening2,32,140 and might prove useful in helping to explain it. Neuroimaging and 
electrophysiological findings are mixed, with some suggesting that prediction leads to 





Box 3: Attention, expectation, and constraints 
Information processing in the brain is limited by the computational capacity of the neural 
apparatus. Attention is used to mitigate this burden and to ensure that limited resources are 
flexibly dedicated to where they are most needed, leading to a range of different top-down 
modulatory effects on early information processing146. Prioritisation of information by 
attentional mechanisms is typically thought to be based on behavioural relevance146,147: 
attention selects parts of the sensory input for further processing depending on an agent’s 
task, goals, and intentions. This situation contrasts with the predictive processes we discuss 
in the main text. These processes respond to context-dependent statistical regularities in 
the external environment, rather than to internal motivational and intentional factors. Such 
processes are often conceptualised in terms of an agent’s expectation24,103,148. In short, in 
this conceptualisation, attention modulates information processing in relation to what is 
relevant, whereas expectation modulates information processing by predicting what is likely 
to happen.  
 
Many studies in the attention literature have conflated behavioural relevance and likelihood 
of occurrence24,103,148. Consequently, the differences in the behavioural and neural 
consequences of expectation and attention are not well understood. Furthermore, there is 
currently no consensus on exactly how the terms ‘attention’ and ‘expectation’ should be 
theoretically demarcated. However, a growing number of studies, including most of those 
we discuss in this article, employ experimental manipulations to isolate or independently 
target these processes, showing distinguishable effects of expectation and attention on 
information processing6,77,81,149,150. Thus, the distinction between attention and expectation 
has not only clear heuristic value but also growing empirical support24. We argue that we 
should further distinguish between the expectation of context-dependent events and 




Agent: In the fields of cybernetics, reinforcement learning, and artificial intelligence an 
agent is an entity that is capable of acting autonomously to self-regulate in the face of 
changes in its environment. 
Information theory: The mathematical formulation of how information is coded, 
transmitted, and processed. Informally, information can be thought of as a measure of the 
reduction of uncertainty. The field of information theory emerged from attempts to solve 
the problem of how to transfer large datasets within limited capacity systems and has 
proven useful in thinking about how neural systems deal with a similar problem. 
Bayesian decision theory: A theory that describes how decisions are optimised by 
application of principles from Bayesian probability: that is, by drawing on probability 
distributions that quantify prior probabilities of events or states. These probabilities are 
referred to as priors and reflect beliefs about a state before new evidence is taken into 
account. 
Perceptual and cognitive inference: The process by which perceptions and beliefs arise 
from the combination of sensory evidence and information based on prior experience or 
knowledge. The process of inference may be optimised by using prior knowledge according 
to Bayes theorem. 
Prediction: An estimate of unobserved or missing information on the basis of a model. 
Within the predictive processing framework, the model is provided by prior knowledge of 
the world. Note that, prediction can be (but is not necessarily) future-oriented. 
Predictive coding: Within neuroscience, a family of algorithms aiming to capture how the 
brain performs probabilistic inference using the mismatch between predicted and expected 
magnitude of a signal. 
Priors: In Bayesian models of perception, action, and cognition, the term is used as 
shorthand for ‘prior probability distributions’, which model the system’s information about 
a world state before current evidence is assessed. Importantly, priors provide information 
that is the basis of the formation of predictions. It is important to note that the term is 
agnostic as to how this prior information is implemented, making combined terms, such as 
‘top-down prior’, which implies a specific mechanism, confusing. 
Utility: In Bayesian decision theory,a function that determines the value of a possible 
situation or outcome. 
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TOC blurb 
Prior experience is incorporated into the brain’s predictive models of the world, enabling 
the accurate interpretation of and responses to new sensory information. In this 
Perspective, Teufel and Fletcher make the case for an important distinction between two 
forms of prediction that may advance our understanding of brain function. 
 
